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The Summa Contra Gentiles St. Thomas Aquinas Book 1 | Book 2 | Book 3-1 | Book 3-2 | Book 4

CONTENTS

• CHAPTER I: CONNECTION OF THE FOREGOING WITH THE SEQUEL
• CHAPTER II: THAT THE CONSIDERATION OF CREATURES IS USEFUL FOR BUILDING UP OUR FAITH
• CHAPTER III: THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF CREATURES AVAILS FOR REFUTING ERRORS AGAINST GOD
• CHAPTER IV: THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE THEOLOGIAN TREAT OF CREATURES IN DIFFERENT WAYS
• CHAPTER V: ORDER OF THE THINGS TO BE SAID
• CHAPTER VI: THAT IT BECOMES GOD TO BE THE SOURCE OF BEING TO OTHER THINGS
• CHAPTER VII: THAT IN GOD THERE IS ACTIVE POWER
• CHAPTER VIII: THAT GOD'S POWER IS HIS SUBSTANCE
• CHAPTER IX: THAT GOD'S POWER IS HIS ACTION
• CHAPTER X: IN WHAT WAY POWER IS ASCRIBED TO GOD
• CHAPTER XI: THAT SOMETHING IS SAID OF GOD IN RELATION TO CREATURES
• CHAPTER XII: THAT RELATIONS SAID OF GOD IN REFERENCE TO CREATURES ARE NOT REALLY IN GOD
• CHAPTERS XIII AND XIV: HOW THE AFORESAID RELATIONS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD
• CHAPTER XV: THAT GOD IS TO ALL THINGS THE CAUSE OF BEING
• CHAPTER XVI: THAT GOD BROUGHT THINGS INTO BEING OUT OF NOTHING
• CHAPTER XVII: THAT CREATION IS NEITHER MOVEMENT NOR CHANGE
• CHAPTER XVIII: HOW TO SOLVE THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST CREATION
• CHAPTER XIX: THAT IN CREATION THERE IS NO SUCCESSION
• CHAPTER XX: THAT NO BODY CAN CREATE
• CHAPTER XXI: THAT IT BELONGS TO GOD ALONE TO CREATE
• CHAPTER XXII: THAT GOD CAN DO ALL THINGS
• CHAPTER XXIII: THAT GOD DOES NOT ACT OF NATURAL NECESSITY
• CHAPTER XXIV: THAT GOD WORKS ACCORDING TO HIS WISDOM
• CHAPTER XXV: HOW THE ALMIGHTY IS SAID TO BE UNABLE TO DO CERTAIN THINGS
• CHAPTER XXVI: THAT THE DIVINE INTELLECT IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN DETERMINED EFFECTS
• CHAPTER XXVII: THAT THE DIVINE WILL IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN EFFECTS
• CHAPTERS XXVIII AND XXIX: HOW THERE IS ANYTHING DUE IN THE PRODUCTION OF THINGS
• CHAPTER XXX: HOW THERE CAN BE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY IN CREATED THINGS
• CHAPTER XXXI: THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR CREATURES TO HAVE BEEN ALWAYS
• CHAPTER XXXII: ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM GOD'S SIDE OF THE QUESTION
• CHAPTER XXXIII: ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CREATURES
• CHAPTER XXXIV: ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE MAKING
• CHAPTER XXXV: SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS, AND FIRST OF THOSE THAT WERE TAKEN FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GOD
• CHAPTER XXXVI: SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS PRODUCED ON THE PART OF THE THINGS MADE
• CHAPTER XXXVII: SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE MAKING OF THINGS
• CHAPTER XXXVIII: ARGUMENTS BY WHICH SOME ENDEAVOUR TO PROVE THAT THE WORLD IS NOT ETERNAL
• CHAPTER XXXIX: THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT FROM CHANCE
• CHAPTER XL: THAT MATTER IS NOT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS
• CHAPTER XLI: THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT ON ACCOUNT OF A CONTRARIETY OF AGENTS
• CHAPTER XLII: THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT THE ORDER OF SECONDARY AGENTS
• CHAPTER XLIII: THAT THE DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS DOES NOT RESULT FROM SOME SECONDARY AGENT INTRODUCING VARIOUS FORMS INTO MATTER
• CHAPTER XLIV: THAT DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS DID NOT RESULT FROM THE DIVERSITY OF MERITS OR DEMERITS
• CHAPTER XLV: WHAT IS IN TRUTH THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS
• CHAPTER XLVI: THAT FOR THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE IT WAS NECESSARY THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME INTELLECTUAL CREATURES
• CHAPTER XLVII: THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE CAPABLE OF WILLING
• CHAPTER XLVIII: THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE OF FREE-WILL IN ACTING
• CHAPTER XLIX: THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A BODY
• CHAPTER L: THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE IMMATERIAL
• CHAPTER LI: THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A MATERIAL FORM
• CHAPTER LII: THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING AND WHAT IS
• CHAPTER LIII: THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES THERE IS ACT AND POTENTIALITY
• CHAPTER LIV: THAT COMPOSITION OF SUBSTANCE AND BEING IS NOT THE SAME AS COMPOSITION OF MATTER AND FORM
• CHAPTER LV: THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE INCORRUPTIBLE
• CHAPTER LVI: IN WHAT WAY IT IS POSSIBLE FOR AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE TO BE UNITED TO THE BODY
• CHAPTER LVII: THE OPINION OF PLATO CONCERNING THE UNION OF THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL WITH THE BODY
• CHAPTER LVIII: THAT THE NUTRITIVE, SENSITIVE, AND INTELLECTIVE FACULTIES IN MAN ARE NOT THREE SOULS
• CHAPTER LIX: THAT MAN'S POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE
• CHAPTER LX: THAT MAN DERIVES HIS SPECIES NOT FROM THE PASSIVE, BUT FROM THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT
• CHAPTER LXI: THAT THE AFORESAID OPINION IS CONTRARY TO THAT OF ARISTOTLE
• CHAPTER LXII: AGAINST THE OPINION OF ALEXANDER ABOUT THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT
• CHAPTER LXIII: THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A TEMPERAMENT, AS GALEN ASSERTED
• CHAPTER LXIV: THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY
• CHAPTER LXV: THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A BODY
• CHAPTER LXVI: AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT INTELLECT AND SENSE ARE THE SAME
• CHAPTER LXVII: AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS THE IMAGINATION
• CHAPTER LXVIII: HOW AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE CAN BE THE FORM OF THE BODY
• CHAPTER LXIX: SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS BY WHICH IT WAS PROVED ABOVE THAT AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE CANNOT BE UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM
• CHAPTER LXX: THAT ACCORDING TO THE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE WE MUST SAY THAT THE INTELLECT IS UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM
• CHAPTER LXXI: THAT THE SOUL IS UNITED TO THE BODY IMMEDIATELY
• CHAPTER LXXII: THAT THE WHOLE SOUL IS IN THE WHOLE BODY AND IN EACH PART THEREOF
• CHAPTER LXXIII: THAT THERE IS NOT ONE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IN ALL MEN
• CHAPTER LXXIV: OF THE OPINION OF AVICENNA, WHO ASSERTED THAT INTELLIGIBLE FORMS ARE NOT PRESERVED IN THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT
• CHAPTER LXXV: SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THE UNITY OF THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT
• CHAPTER LXXVI: THAT THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE BUT PART OF THE SOUL
• CHAPTER LXXVII: THAT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE POSSIBLE AND ACTIVE INTELLECT TO CONCUR IN THE ONE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL
• CHAPTER LXXVIII: THAT ARISTOTLE'S OPINION CONCERNING THE ACTIVE INTELLECT WAS NOT THAT IT IS A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE, BUT RATHER THAT IT IS PART OF THE SOUL
• CHAPTER LXXIX: THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED
• CHAPTERS LXXX AND LXXXI: ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT THE SOUL IS CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED
• CHAPTER LXXXII: THAT THE SOULS OF DUMB ANIMALS ARE NOT IMMORTAL
• CHAPTER LXXXIII: THAT THE HUMAN SOUL BEGINS TO EXIST WITH THE BODY
• CHAPTER LXXXIV: SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS
• CHAPTER LXXXV: THAT THE SOUL IS NOT MADE OF GOD'S SUBSTANCE
• CHAPTER LXXXVI: THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT TRANSMITTED WITH THE SEMEN
• CHAPTER LXXXVII: THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS BROUGHT INTO BEING THROUGH CREATION BY GOD
• CHAPTER LXXXVIII: ARGUMENTS FOR PROVING THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS FORMED FROM THE SEMEN
• CHAPTER LXXXIX: SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS
• CHAPTER XC: THAT AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS UNITED AS A FORM TO NO OTHER THAN THE HUMAN BODY
• CHAPTER XCI: THAT THERE ARE SOME INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES WHICH ARE NOT UNITED TO BODIES
• CHAPTER XCII: OF THE GREAT NUMBER OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
• CHAPTER XCIII: THAT THERE ARE NOT SEVERAL SEPARATE SUBSTANCES OF ONE SPECIES
• CHAPTER XCIV: THAT THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE AND THE SOUL ARE NOT OF ONE SPECIES
• CHAPTER XCV: HOW WE ARE TO UNDERSTAND GENUS AND SPECIES IN SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
• CHAPTER XCVI: THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT GATHER THEIR KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSIBLES
• CHAPTER XCVII: THAT THE INTELLECT OF A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE ALWAYS UNDERSTANDS ACTUALLY
• CHAPTER XCVIII: HOW ONE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE UNDERSTANDS ANOTHER
• CHAPTER XCIX: THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW MATERIAL THINGS
• CHAPTER C: THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW SINGULARS
• CHAPTER CI: WHETHER SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW ALL THINGS AT THE SAME TIME BY THEIR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

N.B. – In the footnotes, D. refers to the Didot edition of Greek authors.

Source: St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. by The English Dominican Fathers from the latest Leonine Edition, Benzinger Brothers: New York, 1924.